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Hundred-Year "History"
of the Theologian's Role
STEPHEN F. BROWN
Pitros Philargis (Petrus Philaretus) was born of Greek
parents on the island of Crete (Candia) around 1340. Left an orphan
at an early age, he was cared for by Italian Franciscans. After joining
the Franciscan order on Crete in 1357, he was sent to Padua for his
studies in the Arts. He attended the Franciscan studium generate at
Norwich and also that at Oxford, where he received his baccalaureate
in theology. From 1378-1380, he lectured ordinarie on the Sentences
at Paris, obtaining his doctorate in theology in the fall of 1381. Quite
likely he became a lecturer in Lombardy, for we know he was lecturing
on theology at the convent of St. Francis in Pavia during the school
year of 1384-1385.
Ioannes Galeatus, the duke of Milan, saw great promise in Peter's
oratorical and administrative abilities and made him one of his coun^
selors. His talents were also noted by Pope Urban VI, who named him
bishop of Placenza in 1386. Early in 1388 Peter became bishop of
Vicenza; a year later, of Novara; and within three years, of Milan,
where he became cardinal in 1405.
These episcopal offices did not interfere with his temporal duties in
the service of Ioannes Galeatus. Peter was the prime minister to
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Galeatus and his son for more than a decade. He was also a "Father of
letters" in the literary circle of the duke of Pavia from the time he
arrived to teach there. He was a close friend of Hubertus Decembris,
the leading representative of humanism in Lombardy, and of Antonius
Lusco, the learned humanist who was chancellor to the duke of Milan.
Peter's sermons and poems show a man deeply learned in humanistic
sources, a man of lofty literary style. His collationes, or principal ser-
mons, presented as introductions to each of his commentaries on the
four books of Lombard's Sentences, reveal a striking literary power and
a vast knowledge of patristic sources. His commentaries on the Sen-
tences offer a clear academic style and show him to be a well-balanced
scholar rather than a deep, creative thinker.
During the last half of Peter's life, the Christian world was in great
disarray. In 1278, Clement VII claimed for himself the papal authority
held legitimately, but not clearly, by Urban VI. The great schism that
ensued in the Western religious world led over the years to a growing
number of advocates of conciliarism. Along with many other cardi-
nals, Peter saw a general council as the solution to this ecclesiastical
conflict. On 25 March 1409, a general council was called at Pisa with
the hope of putting an end to the schism. The council, after many
stormy sessions, declared both popes deposed, and in the nineteenth
session it elected Peter as pope. Taking the name of Alexander V,
Peter did not settle the papal conflict. In fact, his election only con-
fused things more, by increasing the number of popes to three. He set
up his residence at Bologna in January 1410 but died there, in the
convent of St. Francis, on 3 May of the same year.ι
i. For the best general introductions to the life and works of Peter of Candia, see F.
Ehrle, Die Sentenzenkommentar Peters von Candia, Franziskanische Studien 9 (Mϋnster
in Westf.: Aschendorff, 1925); as well as L. Salembier, "Alexandra V," DTC 1
(1923), cols. 722-724; and A. Emmen, "Petrus de Candia, O.F.M. De immaculata
Deiparae conceptione >" in Tractatus quatuor de immaculata conceptione B. Mariae Virginis,
Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica 16 (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae,
1954), pp. 235-259. The only parts of his Sentences-commentary edited so far are the
convocation sermons that he delivered each term on the four books of Lombard and
the De immaculata Deiparae conceptione (an excerpt from book 3 of the Sentences). See
S. F. Brown, "Peter of Candia's Sermons in Praise of Peter Lombard," in Studies
Honoring Ignatius Charles Brady, Friar Minor, Franciscan Institute Publications, theol-
ogy series 6 (St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1976), pp. 141-176; and Emmen, "Petrus de
Candia."
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As we have mentioned, Peter of Candia delivered his lectures on
Lombard's Sentences at Paris over the two-year period 1378-1380. He
opened the prologue to his Commentary on book I, where theology
teachers usually asked what kind of habit or developed ability is fos-
tered by study in the theology faculty, with the question: "Does the
intellect of human beings here in this world acquire through theologi-
cal study evident knowledge of revealed truths?"2
In formulating his response Peter provided a brief introduction to
the positions of the great thirteenth- and fourteenth-century thinkers
who influenced him both negatively and positively: Thomas Aquinas,
John of Naples, Peter Aureoli, John Duns Scotus, William of Ock-
ham, and Gregory of Rimini.
AQUINAS'S POSITION
Peter of Candia notes only two things concerning Aqui-
nas's position: Thomas held that the ability developed by theological
study is science in the proper Aristotelian sense of the term; and, more
specifically, that theological study has the character of a subaltern
science.3 Interpretations of what exactly the Angelic Doctor was try-
ing to say in the first question of his Summa theologiae provoke divi-
sions not only among his modern-day interpreters or such famed
commentators as Cajetan and John of St. Thomas but also among his
contemporaries in the schools of theology.4
Following the detailed critique of Godfrey of Fontaines, the four-
2. Peter of Candia Sent, l.pro (lines 6—8). The edition is given below, in the
appendix.
3. Peter of Candia Sent, l.pro. 1 (lines 163-164, 188-189, 197-198, 444-445). Cf.
Thomas Aquinas Summa theol. 1.1.2.
4. For the interpretations of the classical commentators, see the references given
by J. A. Weisheipl, "The Meaning of Sacra Όoctήna in Summa theobgiae I, q. 1," The
Thomist 28 (1974): 56-60, where he presents the views of Cajetan, Baήez, Sylvius,
John of St. Thomas, Billuart, Buonpensiere, and Garrigou^Lagrange. For the more
recent understandings of Thomas, some starting points would be J. Beumer, "Thomas
von Aquin zum Wesen der Theologie," Scholastik 32 (1955): 195-214; J. F. Bonne-
foy, "La theologie comme science et Γexplication de la foi selon saint Thomas d'Aq-
uin," in Ephemerides Theobgίcae Lovanienses 14 (1937): 421-446, 600-631, and 15
(1938): 491-516; M. D. Chenu, La thέologie comme science au Xllle siecle (Paris: J.
Vrin, 1957); M. Grabmann, "II concetto di scienza secondo s. Tommaso d'Aquino e
le relazioni deila fede e della teologia con la filosofia et le scienze profane," Rivista
filosofia neoscolastica 26 (1934): 127-155; G. F. Van Ackeren, Sacra Doctrina: The
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teenth-century theologians Scotus, Aureoli, Ockham, and Rimini took
Aquinas to mean what he said in the passage in its proper and strict
sense.
5
 Godfrey, for example, in his Quodlibet 4 of 1287, represents
Thomas as holding that the theologian, while proceeding from prin*
ciples that are held by divine faith, arrives at conclusions concerning
which he truly has science.6 The plausibility of such a position is
founded on the parallel that Aquinas saw between Aristotle's view of
the relation of a subalternating and subaltern science and the case of
theology. Just as a subaltern science, such as optics, borrows principles
from a subalternating science, such as geometry, and still is a true, if
subaltern, science, so theology borrows its principles from the knowl'
edge that God and the blessed in heaven have of the divine mysteries.
Using such truths as premises, theology arrives at conclusions that are
true, though subaltern, science.7
Godfrey, however, accepted neither the logic of the main argument
nor the simile. For him science carries a twofold certitude: the certi-
tude of evidence and the certitude of adherence, i.e., holding to the
truth of something without any doubt. Faith has the latter type of
certitude, but not the certitude of evidence. Faith, then, resembles
knowledge to the extent that it has certainty but differs from knowl-
edge because it lacks the certitude of evidence. Faith also is like
opinion insofar as both faith and opinion lack the certitude given by
evidence; but faith differs from opinion since it has the certitude of
adherence, which opinion lacks.
Subject of the First Question of the Summa Theologica of St. Thomas Aquinas (Rome:
Catholic Book Agency, 1952); and the article of Weisheipl mentioned above. C.
Dumont provides helpful leads to early attemps to interpret Thomas in a more favor-
able light than Godfrey of Fontaines in his article "La reflexion sur la methode
theologique (II)," Nouvelle revue thέologique 84 (1962): 26-32.
5. Scotus Sent. 3.24-1.2-3 (ed. Vives, 15:36-37); William Ockham Scήptum in 1
Sent. pro. 7 (ed. G. Gal and S. F. Brown, 184); Peter Aureoli Scriptum 1.pro. 1.2-8
(ed. E. M. Buytaert, 1:132-133); Gregory of Rimini Sent. 1.pro. 1.3 (ed. Venice,
1521, a6vL-Q).
6. Godfrey of Fontaines Quodl 4.10 (ed. M. DeWulf and J. Hoffmans, Les phi-
losophes beiges 2:261). Cf. P. Tihon, Foi et thέologie selon Godefroid de Fontaines (Paris
and Bruges: Desclee De Brouwer, 1966), pp. 120-131. Henry of Ghent likewise crit-
icizes the subalternation theory of Aquinas in his Summa quaestionum ordinariarum 7.5
(Paris, 1520, ff. 53r-54v).
7. Thomas Aquinas Summa theol 1.1.2.
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Basing his argument on the foundation of these distinctions, God-
frey argued:
Therefore, to say that the principles of theology or of any science what-
soever within theology are only believed and not known or understood,
and thus while only having the certitude of adherence that they produce
the certitude of science in the conclusions drawn from them, is to say that
conclusions are better known than the principles, namely, that the con-
clusions have both types of certitude whereas the principles have only the
one. Now this is to say contradictory things, and it harms on a large scale
theology and its teachers to propose such fictitious claims concerning it to
those entering upon its study.8
Neither is the simile that is introduced into the argument worth-
while, because no one with a balanced mind understands that subaltern
science is truly science if it only has opinion about its principles, for
it gets them from a higher science and awards to them purely hu-
man faith due to the fact that they are known and handed down by
an expert in a higher science. For whatever is drawn from principles
that are handed down or held on faith—since they could not have
certitude unless they went back and established it in those prin-
ciples—would only be believed or accepted as opinion. Whatever is
drawn from such principles might even be weaker than the principles
themselves. So, then, is it the case with theology: although the
principles of theology may be most certain in themselves and evident
to God and the blessed, yet insofar as they are revealed by God, they
are believed. Just as human authority begets opinion, a state of mind
lacking both types of certitude, so divine authority produces faith, a
state of mind having the certitude of adhering without fear of error. Of
what advantage is it for a person using such principles accepted on
authority and only believed by him and deriving conclusions from
them, that the blessed have the certitude of evidence in regard to the
principles and that the principles in themselves are evident and cer-
tain? The certitude of the blessed does not bring him evidence. There-
fore, it is necessary that the principles of subaltern science be certain
with the certitude of evidence in order that one may have science of
the conclusion derived from them.9
8. Godfrey of Fontaines Qvtodl 4.10 (ed. DeWulf and Hoffmans, Les phibsophes
beiges, 2:261).
9 . Godfrey Quodl 4.10(262).
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Early reaction to Godfrey's presentation of the subaltern approach
to theology gave rise to a different reading of Thomas's text by James
of Metz,10 Hervaeus Natalis,11 and Bernard of Auvergne.12 By the
time we come to Duns Scotus, the arguments defending the subaltern
science position are not strictly speaking Thomas's but those of these
followers.13 In Peter Aureoli's Scήptum, the supports for Aquinas's
theory are sevenfold and subtle, but Aureoli admits frankly that they
may not really represent Thomas's own position ("quamvis non po-
nantur ab eis").14 In fact they come from Godfrey and Scotus, at least
in their direct formulation, though in turn they may well represent
earlier attempts to clarify Thomas's position itself15 When we come
to our author, Peter of Candia, any real historical connection with
Aquinas is gone. Candia gives Aquinas's name, but the position is
not meant to be a historical portrait of the Angelic Doctor's theory.
Thomas's position represents the limit position of evidence: the study
of theology never brings the student to such evidence that he in this
life has the certitude of evidence for his conclusions. To expect such is
to ask too much of theology.16
THE THEOLOGY OF CONSEQUENCES
If there is an outer limit of expectation for Candia, so is
there an inner limit of expectation—when one allows no evidence at
all in regard to the contents of theological discussion and reduces
theology to a knowledge of consequences. In this view the theologian
is considered a believer who has the ability to lead theological conclu-
sions back to the basic principles or truths of faith. Already in the
10. Cf. C. Dumont, "La reflexion," p. 26, n. 64.
11. See E. Krebs, Theologie und Wissenschaft nach der Lehre der Hochscholastik an der
Hand der bisher ungedruckten Defensa doctrinae D. Thomae des Hervaeus Natalis, BGPM
11/3-4 (Mϋnster, 1912), p. 37*.
12. See P. Stella, "Teologi e teologia nelle 'Reprobationes' di Bernardo
d'Auvergne ai Quodlibeti di Goffredo di Fontaines," Salesianum 19 (1957): 187-189.
13. Scotus Sent. 3.24.1.2-3 (ed. Vives, 15:36-37).
14. Aureoli Scriptum 1. pro. 1.1.23 (ed. Buytaert, 1:139). For the arguments them-
selves, see nos. 2-8 (1:132-133).
15. See S. R. Streuer, Die theobgische Einleitungslehre des Petrus Aureoli (Werl in
Westf.: Dietrich-Coelde Verlag, 1968), pp. 64-65.
16. Peter of Candia Sent, l.pro.l (lines 162-166).
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1230s Odo Rigaud defended a place for theology among the sciences,
defined according to the new Aristotelian ideal, by showing that
sacred science uses scientific procedures. The theologian truly arrives
at conclusiones causaliter demonstratae, since he follows the demonstra-
tive process of Aristotelian science.17
Though theology may imitate the Aristotelian method of argu-
mentation, still the perception of consequences is not, in Godfrey of
Fontaines's eyes, for example, a sufficient definition of the goal of
theological study.18 "This is to attribute too little to the theologian's
task." Theological study should also deepen our knowledge of the
mysteries of our faith.19
In truth, and despite the rhetoric of their opponents, neither Odo
Rigaud nor John of Naples—to whom the position is also often
attributed—nor any other theologian held that the sole goal of theo-
logical study was the perception of consequences.20 Logical ability
plays an important role in theological study, but it is not the only, nor
even the most important, role. By the time we come to Peter of
Candia, however, the intensity of earlier debate concerning the theol-
ogy of consequences is gone. For him this is, once again, a limit
position. That is why he represents it in its absolute and exclusive
form: "others have said that theology is only a knowledge of conse-
quences."21
THE POSITION OF PETER AUREOLI
Candia's format so far reveals not only the framework of
his own treatment, but also the cadres of many fourteenth-century
conceptions of theology. Theological study never attains evidence the
way a strict Aristotelian science does—that would claim so much
evidence that it would take away faith. Nor is it limited to the study of
formal logical relationships between theological principles and con-
clusions drawn from them—that gives no evidence at all to truths of
17. C. Dumont, "La reflexion," pp. 20-22.
18. Godfrey of Fontaines Quodl 9.20 (ed. DeWulf and Hoffmans, 4:285).
19. Ibid.
20. Cf. R. Guelluy, Phίlosophie et thέobgie cheχ Guillaume d'Ockkam (Louvain and
Paris: E. Nauwelaerts-J. Vrin, 1947), p. 55, n. 1.
21. Peter of Candia Sent, l.pro.l (lines 191-192).
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the faith but shows at best only a logical acumen regarding the inter-
connection of theological truths. These dimensions are the general
limits within which Peter of Candia asks the question: "Does the
intellect of human beings here in this world acquire through theologi-
cal study evident knowledge of revealed truths?" In formulating his
response within the framework just described, his theological com-
panions now are Scotus, Aureoli, Ockham, and Rimini.
Within the borders of these two limit positions, Candia presented
two approaches to theology with which he disagreed on certain points.
They were the declarative theology of the French Franciscan Peter
Aureoli, who commented on the Sentences at Paris in 1316-1318,22
and the deductive theology of the Augustinian hermit Gregory of Ri-
mini, who began his Sentences-commentary, also at Paris, in 1343.23
Aureoli realized that many different types of intellectual activities
legitimately go on in theology and that one could not reasonably limit
the study to what is properly theological discourse.24 Sometimes, for
example, theologians are no different from metaphysicians. When
they argue for the unicity or infinity of God, they do so demonstra-
tively from necessary and naturally known propositions that could
force the intellectual assent of a pagan or a philosopher. When theolo-
gians argue in this way frequently, they develop a certain intellectual
facility. Yet such a habit is metaphysical rather than properly theo-
logical.25
At other times theologians are quite different from metaphysicians.
They argue from premises that have their origin and ground in faith.
In arguing correctly from premises rooted in revelation, they can pro-
duce conclusions that are not evident in the way metaphysical conclu-
sions are, but that are nonetheless certain, provided the argument
22. Aureoli Scήptum I, intro. by E. M. Buytaert (l:xv). For the latest appreciation
of Aureoli, see K. H. Tachau, Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham (Leiden and
New York: E. J. Brill, 1988).
23. O. Grassi, "La questione della teologia come scienza in Gregorio da Rimini,"
Rivista di filosofia neoscolastica 68/1 (1976): 610, n. 1.
24. Aureoli Scήptum l.pro.l (ed. Buytaert, 1:132-175). Aureoli's position on the
nature of theology is explained in detail by Streuer, Einleitungslehre, pp. 20-78. For
Candia's summary, see Peter of Candia Sent, l.pro.l (lines 91—115).
25. Aureoli Scήptum 1.1.2.77-79 (ed. Buytaert, 1:154-155; hereafter, citations of
Aureoli Scήptum 1 shorten the parenthetical reference to the first volume of Buytaert's
edition to page numbers only).
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consists of two revealed premises or one revealed and one necessary
premise. An example of the latter type could be: (1) In Christ there
are two intellectual natures, a divine one and a human one. (2) Now
every intellectual nature has its own will. (3) Therefore, in Christ
there are two wills, a divine one and a human one. Such a conclusion
is held by faith, and Aureoli asserted that by arguments of this kind
one does not acquire any habit distinct from faith. One holds to the
conclusion by faith unhesitatingly, not because of the deduction per
se, but because one believes the faith-premise from which the conclu-
sion is inferred by necessity. What takes place here is a specification or
a making explicit of faith.26
Sometimes, furthermore, theologians may begin with premises that
are premises of faith and join to them in their arguments premises that
are probable. The result is a conclusion that is opinion. The same
result occurs if they work completely with unrevealed, probable prem-
ises of natural reason. In many questions within theological treatises,
this procedure is the type of argument in play. It provides us with the
opinions of theologians.27
Godfrey of Fontaines, we might recall, distinguished three types
of knowledge: science (having both the certitude of evidence and
the certitude of adherence); faith (having only the certitude of ad-
herence); and opinion (having neither certitude). In his critique of
Thomas he focused on the knowledge of conclusions. Aureoli con-
tinues to this point along the same line: he analyzes the different types
of arguments and the premises involved and gives the knowledge-
value of the conclusions in terms of the weight of their varying prem-
ises. Some of the arguments in theology do give us conclusions that
are truly scientific. Others present conclusions lacking the certitude of
evidence but possessing the certitude of conviction. Finally, many
others offer conclusions that are plainly the opinions of theologians.
Granting the precision of such detailed analysis of the knowledge-
value of various conclusions, and realizing that a great deal of effort in
theology is given to such deductive activity, Aureoli thought that he
had not yet come to what theology is properly about. In carrying out
their proper role, theologians do not focus on conclusions drawn from
articles of faith. Rather, they center themselves on what such deduc-
26. Aureoli Saiptum 1.1.2.80-88 (155-158).
27. Aureoli Scήptum 1.1.2.89-90 (158-159).
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tive theology would call premises or principles, certain revealed prop-
ositions whose truth has been determined by the Church—namely,
the articles of faith. They do not start with them as principles and
unfold new conclusions of varying worth depending on the other
premises they use; rather, they focus on these very articles of faith and
attempt to bring clarity to them (declarare eas).28 For Aureoli, this is
the discipline of the theologian that is most properly theological. It is
not science, since theologians do not demonstrate such truths. Nei-
ther is it faith, since they already believe them. Nor is it opinion,
since they bring forth arguments from other sciences that give support
for the articles of faith, or explain the meaning of the terms of these
articles, or respond to doubts raised against them. All of this is not
opinion, for such operations do not bring with them any hesitancy
regarding the truths of faith. Indeed, it would be foolish to spend so
much effort in explaining, supporting, and defending the articles of
faith if the end result were to weaken one's faith by reducing it to
hesitant opinion. In developing such skills of support, clarification,
and defense, the theologian does not produce conviction such that he
can now affirm these truths without fear of error. He was already
convinced through faith. Rather, he develops a habit distinct from
faith—allowing him to make more clear what he already unhesi-
tatingly believed. It was this type of developed ability that the quaes*
tiones of the theologians, the Books of the Sentences, the writings of the
Fathers, and the readings and expositions of Scripture were intended
to foster. A theologian in the proper sense of the term, in contrast to
the ordinary believer, is said to understand to some degree what he
believes and is "ready to give an account concerning those things
which are in him by faith."29 He knows how "to defend the faith
against the impious and strengthen it in the minds of the pious."30
Surely such a declarative theology carries on argumentation to sup-
port or illumine in some way the articles of faith. It borrows from other
sciences premises of all different weights and employs them to support
or illustrate as well as possible the truth of these beliefs. But it never
demonstrates them in a strictly philosophical sense. Aureoli borrows
an expression from Averroes to help him say what such rationes proba*
28. Aureoli Scήptum 1.1.2.92-128 (159-170).
29. 1 Peter 3.15.
30. Augustine De Tήnit. 14.1 (PL 42:1037; CCL 50A:421-422).
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biles accomplish. They help us to "imagine more clearly with our
intellect" the revealed truths that we hold because of faith.31
Both the simple believer and the theologian believe the truths most
firmly. But there is a difference between the two. The simple believer
does not "intellectually imagine" or grasp his faith in any clear way,
and this for a number of reasons. He does not understand the meaning
of the terms, or he encounters objections to the faith which so en-
tangle and confuse his mind that he cannot formulate exactly what he
believes, or he doesn't have examples or analogies or any kind of par-
allels for what he believes, or he has no "probable reasons" to sup-
port him in his belief. A theologian surpasses a simple believer in just
these respects: he has developed an ability to explain terms; he can
consider and respond to objections; he is able to offer apt examples
and supply probable arguments for the truths of faith.32
If one wishes to classify what a theologian does properly as theolo-
gian according to the Aristotelian division of intellectual virtues in
book 6 of the Nicomachean Ethics, then it would be best not to call it
science. For science gives evidence that forces our assent, whereas we
already believe and do so on the authority of God revealing. What the
theologian does should rather be called wisdom, for Aristotle describes
wisdom as "the science of and insight into the things that are noblest
by nature."3 3 Now if Aristotle considers anything to have the charac-
ter of wisdom, then surely it is metaphysics. He gives it that title in
book 1 of his Metaphysics.34 At least in some parts of the Metaphysics,
namely, in book 4, where he defends its principles, and in book 5,
where he explains its terms, Aristotle simply clarifies and defends the
principles and terms. He does not demonstrate them or make them
evident through syllogistic reasoning.35
A theologian performs a number of acts that show that he has
developed many intellectual virtues or habits. He does at times dem-
onstrate certain truths, not qua theologian, but qua metaphysican. In
this activity he does produce science in regard to some truths about
God. Furthermore, he makes many other deductions that render the
31. Aureoli Scriptum 1.1.3.112 (164).
32. Aureoli Scriptum 1.1.3.94 (160).
33. Aureoli Scήptum 1.1.3.117-129 (166-170).
34. Cf. Aureoli Scήptum 1.1.3.118-125 (166-168).
35. Aureoli Scήptum 1.1.3.126 (168-169).
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content of the faith more explicit. Similarly he provides suitable theo-
logical opinion regarding the truths of faith. But in a more special and
proper way a theologian qua theologian clarifies, defends, and offers
probable arguments for the mysteries of faith, just as he explains the
terms expressing these mysteries. Most properly, however, he provides
insight. So declarative theology is wisdom, "the science of and insight
into things which are the noblest by nature." It is not wisdom under
the scientific aspect of wisdom but, rather, under the aspect of under-
standing or insighty for it brings light, understanding, or "insight into
the noblest things by nature," i.e., the divine mysteries of our faith.36
It is no wonder that Augustine also gave this study the title of
wisdom. He counts it the form of knowledge "by which that most
wholesome faith is begotten, nourished, defended, strengthened"; and
it knows how our faith "helps the pious and may be defended against
the impious."37 He has also called it "understanding," as in book 9 of
the De Trinitate, where he locates this type of knowledge between
simple faith and that certain knowledge which will be made perfect
only after this life. In the same book he urges us "to seek to understand
this mystery [of the Trinity], praying for help from God himself, whom
we desire to understand; and as much as he grants, attempting to
explain what we understand."38 Augustine also calls this knowledge
"the light of wisdom," as in his first homily On John's Gospel, where he
informs us that God illumines the little ones in the Church with the
light of faith, and the lofty souls, who are the mountains, with the
light of wisdom.39
Richard of St. Victor, too, in the opening pages of his De Trinitαte,
urges us "to strive, insofar as we are able that we may understand
[intelligamus] what we believe."40 The opening chapter of the same
work is his meditation on the text of Isaiah: "Unless you believe, you
shall not understand [inteΐligetis]."41
For Aureoli, in sum, the habit that is most properly acquired by the
theologian is a habit distinct from faith. It does not cause our assent to
36. Aureoli Scήptum 1.1.3.129 (170).
37. Aureoli Scήptum 1.1.3.127 (169).
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
40. Aureoli Scήptum 1.1.3.128 (169-170).
41. Ibid.
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the articles of faith but presupposes such assent. Positively, it brings
some understanding to our faith, makes it somewhat clearer, provides
us with some imaginative understanding of the divine truths. Within
the Aristotelian division of the intellectual virtues this properly theo-
logical habit should be considered wisdom, under the aspect of wisdom
as insight or understanding, for it brings understanding, the light of
wisdom, or "insight into the noblest things by nature."42
Although Peter of Candia knew the detailed criticisms that both
William of Ockham43 and Gregory of Rimini44 brought against Au-
reoli, he limits his own evaluation of Aureoli's position to two points.
First, no matter what arguments the theologian in his most proper
work as a theologian might use in seeking to support the articles of
faith, they will be probable reasons. On Aureoli's own admission they
do not force our assent. What this means is that such arguments do
not beget science or faith, otherwise they would command our assent;
so they must beget opinion. Yet Aureoli himself argues that the most
properly theological habit is not opinion, since if it were it would
bring the hesitancy which is characteristic of opinion. In short, he
seems to contradict himself.45
Second, when Aureoli gives declarative theology the Aristotelian
title wisdom he seems off the mark. If he takes wisdom in a metaphori-
cal sense in view of some similarity between declarative theology and
the Aristotelian view of wisdom, he would just as well be justified in
calling declarative theology a jackass, since both a jackass and declara-
tive theology have some similarity: they are both beings. If, on the
other hand, he means that declarative theology is wisdom in the
proper Aristotelian sense of the word, then he is deceived. For Aris-
totle wisdom is linked to evidence. It is even more directly linked to
evidence than science is. Science is distinct from insight and gets its
evidence from insight, whereas wisdom is not distinct from insight, at
least in the sense that insight is one of its components: wisdom is "the
science of and insight into the most noble things by nature." So, if
Aureoli rejects Aquίnas's theory of theology as a subaltern science
because a subaltern science gives evidence, then a fortiori he ought to
42. Aureoli Scήptum 1.1.3.129 (170).
43. William Ockham Scriptum In 1 Sent. pro.7 (ed. Gal and Brown, 195-196).
44. Gregory of Rimini Sent. 1.pro. 1.2 (ed. Venice, 1521, a2vK-a3vK).
45. Peter of Candia Sent, l.pro.l (lines 117-147).
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reject wisdom as a proper title for his declarative theology, since wis-
dom all the more gives evidence*46 In short, theology is neither sci-
ence nor wisdom in the strict Aristotelian senses of the terms,
Candia allows these observations to suffice as his direct criticisms of
Aureoli's view. The overall weakness of Aureoli's position will appear
more fully as our author argues for his own conception of theology.47
THE DEDUCTIVE THEOLOGY
OF GREGORY OF RIMINI
Peter Aureoli's declarative theology was also the main
target of Gregory of Rimini's treatise. If an unbeliever uses what a
Christian theologian like Aureoli calls probable reasons, he arrives at
conclusions that are opinion. Since opinion is distinct from a properly
theological habit, our fictive unbeliever would not develop a theologi-
cal habit. Imagine for a moment that he becomes a believer. Auto-
matically now he has a theological habit, and therefore a new habitus
or developed ability, without developing through any further study
anything he had not already developed within himself before. What
wonderful magic!48
With this and similar arguments Gregory attempted to dismantle
the theologia declarativa of Aureoli. In no way, however, did he think
that he was undermining the theological procedures of Augustine or
Richard of St. Victor, on whom he depended, as he attacked Aureoli's
presentation:
I ask that Reverend Master whose opinion of what is proper theological
discourse I have disproved to go back to the De Trinitate and find anywhere
in that or in Augustine's other books places where he proves from probable
propositions that God is three in one. I think he could not find any. But
he'll only find what Augustine proved from the authorities of Scrip-
ture. . . . Let him go back and reread what he has read inattentively.49
Rimini's own attentive reading of Augustine, Dionysius the
Areopagite, Hugh of St. Victor, and Peter Lombard led him to differ-
46. Peter of Candia Sent, l.pro.l (lines 148-169).
47. See the last section, below.
48. Gregory of Rimini Sent. 1.pro. 1.2 (ed. Venice, 1521, a2vMN).
49. Gregory of Rimini Sent. 1.pro. 1.2 (ed. Venice, 1521, a3rB).
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ent conclusions regarding the nature of theology and the role of the
theologian,50
First off, he agreed with Aureoli that theology was not science in the
strict Aristotelian sense of the term. Like Aureoli, Rimini follows
Godfrey of Fontaines and Duns Scotus in their critique of the sub'
altern science theory of Aquinas and his followers,51 Theological
study does not bring believers to evident knowledge of the truths of
the faith, whereas science in both its subaltern and nonsubaltern
forms produces evident knowledge,52
Properly, theology extends the content of belief, and thus is not a
habit distinct from faith. If a person accepts the truth of Sacred Scrip-
ture and furthermore is strong in intellectual habits, then reflection on
Sacred Scripture will bring him to new conclusions. This is the situa-
tion with a theologian. He sees many truths that are not formally
contained as such in Sacred Scripture but that follow necessarily from
what is contained there. Now whether they are articles of faith or
not, whether they are knowable through other sciences or not, and
whether they are determined as revealed truths by the Church or not,
he sees that they necessarily flow from what is formally revealed as
such in Sacred Scripture. These are what Rimini means by theological
conclusions.53
The theologian in his proper role sees that these truths demanded
by intellectual reflection on the faith must be assented to with the
same force of assent as the truths found in Sacred Scripture and that
they must be admitted as unhesitatingly as the principles or premises
found formally in Sacred Scripture itself. Theology thus extends the
content of faith: it is a certain acquired faith. It is a habitus creditivus, a
developed ability that extends our faith to its further logical and
intelligible implications.54
Peter of Candia has no strong objection to this position of Rimini
except for the exclusion that seems hidden in Rimini's attack on Au-
reoli.55 As we shall see in Candia's own conclusions concerning the
50. Gregory of Rimini Sent. 1.pro. 1.2 (ed. Venice, 1521, a2vQ-a3vK).
51. Gregory of Rimini Sent. 1.pro. 1.2 (ed. Venice, 1521, a6vL-Q).
52. Ibid.
53. Gregory of Rimini Sent. 1.pro. 1.2 (ed. Venice, 1521, a3rC, a2vQ-a3rD).
54. Peter of Candia Sent, l.pro.l (lines 171-179).
55. Peter of Candia Sent, l.pro.l (lines 182-186).
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nature of theology, he agrees with Rimini's affirmative tendency.56
Rimini's fault, in Candia's eyes, is found in what he omits—in his
imbalance.
CANDIA'S OWN VISION
OF THE NATURE OF THEOLOGY
Peter of Candia laid no claim to originality. He simply
wished to steer a clear middle course between those who argue for too
much, as with Aquinas's contention that theology is science in Aris-
totle's proper sense of that term, and those who argue for too little, as
with those who might hold a theology of consequences. Even more
specifically he wished to avoid the extreme of Aureoli's declarative
theology, which denied that the proper role of the theologian was to
extend the content of the faith ("nee habitus creditivus sed tantum
declarative"), and the extreme of Rimini's deductive theology, which
considered the proper, and seemingly the only, role of the theologian
was to extend the content of faith ("tantum creditivus").57
In choosing his middle road between these various extremes he
chose as his guides those who led the way down the middle ("inter
omnes mediando"): John Duns Scotus and William of Ockham.58
Following their principles, Candia chose a mediating role and pre-
sented a view of theology that avoided the excessive and exclusive
accents in the positions of Aureoli and Rimini by fostering a marriage
of declarative and deductive theology.59
This marriage, in Candia's presentation, is not precisely a union of
equal partners. Aureoli's declarative theology seems to have the upper
hand. Three of Candia's first four conclusions are slanted in the direc-
56. See his fifth and sixth conclusions (lines 377-406).
57. Peter of Candia Sent, l.pro.l (lines 198-200).
58. Peter of Candia Sent, l.pro.l (lines 205-208). Cf. Scotus Sent. 3.24.1 (ed.
Vives, 15:36-49); William Ockham Scriptum in 1 Sent. pro.7 (ed. Gal and Brown,
183—206). For a general presentation of Scotus's position, see A. Magrini, loannis
Duns Scoti Doctήna de Scienύfica Theologiae Natura, Studia Antoniana 5 (Rome:
Collegium Antonianum, 1952). A detailed analysis of Sent. 3.24 is given by L.
Walter, Das Glaubensverstάndnis bei Johannes Duns Scotus (Paderborn: Schoningh,
1968), pp. 59—92. Ockham's prologue, q. 7, is given an excellent treatment by R.
Guelluy, Phibsophie et thέobgie, pp. 221-258.
59. Peter of Candia Sent, l.pro.l (lines 209-535).
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tion of declarative theology. In fact the first conclusion, that through
theological study the student acquires a habit distinct from faith, is
one of Aureoli's basic theses.60 Quite suitably, then, Candia's argu-
ments supporting this conclusion are taken, fere verbotenus, from Au-
reoli's text.6 1 Furthermore, Candia's attack on Rimini in the first
conclusion would appear to make deductive theology a lesser partner
in the marriage.62 It is a very real partner even so, as Candia's fifth
and sixth conclusions show.63
For Candia there are two basic ways in which a theologian may
approach the truths of revelation, and this is the ground for the union
or marriage. He may either approach them as a unified message or else
focus on the individual truths. Declarative theology favors the first
approach, whereas deductive theology leans toward the second.64
Declarative theology does not aim at extending the content of
faith. It takes that content as it is and, following the urging of 1 Peter,
it prepares the theologian to account for this faith. It makes him, in
Augustine's phrase, able to show "in what way this belief itself may
both help the pious and be defended against the impious." It also
clarifies the meaning of the terms in the propositions expressing the
truths of revelation and argues with probable reasons for these truths.
Still, one of its principal tasks, Candia argues, makes it especially
different from deductive theology: declarative theology focuses on the
unified message. Accepting on faith the whole revelation with equal
immediacy, the declarative theologian links together one truth within
the revelation with another and shows how these mysteries hang
together, how one implies the other, and how all are interrelated.
Such collation of the mysteries of faith does not bring out or deduce
new beliefs but shows the coherence of the mysteries.65
This developed ability permitting the theologian to account for this
interrelation of the mysteries is distinct from faith itself, since the
simple believer does not have the same facility. There is yet another
sense in which such an ability is distinct from faith. None of the
60. Peter of Candia Sent, l.pro.l (lines 209-264). Cf. Aureoli Scήptum
l.pro. 1.96-111 (ed. Buytaert, 160-164).
61. Peter of Candia Sent, l.pro.l (lines 209-264).
62. Peter of Candia Sent, l.pro.l (lines 243-264).
63. Peter of Candia Sent, l.pro.l (lines 377-406).
64. Peter of Candia Sent, l.pro.l (lines 252-264, 350-367).
65. Peter of Candia Sent, l.pro.l (lines 350-376).
PETER OF CANDIA ON THE THEOLOGIAN S ROLE 173
declarative activities of a theologian brings about faith or makes him
believe more firmly. He assents to the whole revelation because of his
trust in the revealing God, not because of the harmony of the myster-
ies or the power of probable reasons.66
If deductive theology seems slighted in Candia's early conclusions,
then it receives a real legitimacy in his fifth conclusion. Although one
way to look at the truths of the faith is to focus on the whole revela-
tion with equal immediacy, there is another legitimate way of looking
at the truths of faith. This second way is the procedure accented by
Rimini's deductive theology. It takes the truths individually and looks
at them as premises for deducing further truths of faith. In such a
procedure the theologian abandons the equal immediacy of revelation
and rather centers his attention on new truths in relation to the ones
which are prior. The new ones are held through the medium of the
prior ones. Our adherence to the derived truths is due to our ad-
herence to the principles or premises.67
For Candia both of these approaches are legitimate ways of con-
sidering the truths of faith. We can consider the divine revelation as
truths of faith in themselves or as principles or premises for deriving
further contents of our faith. Since both are legitimate ways of looking
at divine revelation, it is false to speak of a declarative or deductive
theology as though there were two distinct opposed theologies. We
should rather speak of them as two legitimate and necessary theo-
logical habits or matured abilities that should be developed by all
theologians.68
Both these developed abilities are the properly theological habits
that theologians develop through study in the theology faculty. They
may also develop in their studies many other habits, such as the ones
developed by metaphysicians or natural philosophers. Through these
latter abilities theologians may acquire evidence of the truths they
examine, but not qua theologians.69 Theologians, as theologians,
through their declarative or deductive activities which are properly
theological, do not acquire evidence.70 As Candia's formal answer to
66. Peter of Candia Sent, l.pro.l (lines 282-299).
67. Peter of Candia Sent, l.pro.l (lines 376-388).
68. Peter of Candia Sent, l.pro.l (lines 391-406).
69. Peter of Candia Sent, l.pro.l (lines 407-442).
70. Peter of Candia Sent l.pro.l (lines 483-494).
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the original question phrases it at the end of the prologue: "Through
theological study only declarative and faith-extending habits are de-
veloped, and through these developed abilities no evident knowledge
of the articles of faith is acquired."71
Boston College
71. Peter of Candia Sent l.pro.3 (Bibl. Apostolica Vaticana lat. 1081, f. 20ra):
"Per exercitium theologicum non adquiritur nisi habitus creditivus vel declarativus per
quos de articulis fidei nulla notitia evidens adquiritur."
Appendix
The Sentences -commentary of Peter of Candia exists in
whole or in part in thirty-seven manuscripts.1 In the judgment of
Ehrle the best manuscript is that contained in the Bibl. Apostolica
Vaticana, cod. lat. 108L2 Emmen also used the same manuscript as
the base for his edition of Peter's question on the Immaculate Concep-
tion and demonstrated its undeniable superiority.3 We have used this
manuscript for our present edition of the first question of Peter's pro-
logue to book 1 of the Sentences. Any alterations that we have made to
the text are found between angle brackets, ( )• The text we have
edited is found on if. 9ra-12rb.
<PETRI DE CANDIA 1
PROLOGUS LIBRI SENTENTIARUM)
Super materiam prologi totius Sententiarum libri
generalis incipit quaestio. Circa prologum in quo communiter
quaerunt doctores de habitu per studium theologicum ad- 5
quisito, quaero istam quaestionem: utrum intellectus viatoris
per exercitium theologicum adquirat evidentem notitiam de
credibilibus revelatis.
Et arguo quod non tribus mediis, et primo sic: ex nullis
propositionibus probabilibus vel simpliciter creditis adquiritur 10
evidens notitia; sed totum theologicum exercitium est circa
probabilia vel simpliciter credita; ergo quaestio falsa. Con-
sequentia patet. Et maior declaratur, quoniam ex probabili-
bus causatur opinio et ex credibilibus fides; sed tam fides quam
opinio sunt habitus inevidentes, aliter habentes opiniones 15
vel credulitates de conclusionibus contradictoriis haberent
notitias evidentes, quod videtur falsum. Sed minor probatur
1. Emmen, "Petrus de Candia," pp. 247—250.
2. Ehrle, Der Sentenzenkommentar, p. 21.
3. Emmen, "Petrus de Candia," pp. 261-266.
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sic: omne intellectuale exercitium vel est commune elen-
chum, vel topicum, sive demonstrativum, vel sophisticum, ut
20 patet per Philosophum sufFicienter dividentem intellectuale
exercitium in libris logicae disciplinae.4 Sed constat quod
theologicum exercitium non est commune (elenchum), nee
demonstrativum vel sophisticum: ergo per sufficientem divi-
sionem quadrimembrem et remotionem trium partium se-
25 quitur quod est topicum vel probabile sive creditivum, quod
erat probandum.
Praeterea, et secundo arguo sic: quodlibet statui viae in-
compossibile repugnat intellectui viatoris; sed evidens notitia
de credibilibus revelatis est huiusmodi; ergo quaestio Falsa,
30 Consequentia et maior patent. Sed minor probatur sic: quo-
rum rationes Formales contradicunt et ipsa sunt ad invicem
incompossibilia; sed ratio Formalis fidei evidenti notitiae con-
tradicit, ut patet per Apostolum, Ad Heb. I I , 5 Fidem taliter
describentem: Fides est substantia rerum sperandarum, argμmen-
35 turn non apparentium; ergo Fides et notitia evidens sunt ad
invicem incompossibiles. Nunc vero Fides est statui viae an-
nexa, ut patet per Apostolum, ί Ad Cor. 13:6 Videmus nunc
per speculum et in aenigmate; tune autem facie ad faciem. Ergo
notitia evidens veritatum credibilium est statui viae incom-
40 possibilis, quod erat probandum.
Praeterea, et tertio, arguo sic: quaelibet notitia ponens
viatorem in termino repugnat viatori; sed evidens notitia veri-
tatum credibilium est huiusmodi; ergo quaestio Falsa. Conse-
quentia et maior patent. Et minor probatur: quodlibet statui
45 patriae annexum de necessitate ponit habentem illud in pa-
tria; sed evidens notitia (veritatum credibilium) est de necessi-
tate statui patriae annexa, iuxta illud loan 17:7 Haec est vita
aeterna} ut cognoscant tey solum Deum verum. Quae auctoritas
non potest intelligi nisi de notitia evidente, cum (nulla) alia
50 sit nobis pro statu viae possibilis. Ergo evidens notitia veri-
tatum credibilium ponit habentem illam in termino.
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Ad oppositum, et pro veritate quaestionis, arguo tantum
unico medio: omnis habitus intellectualis est sapientia, vel
intellectus, scientia vel prudentia, ars, fides vel opinio. Sed
constat quod per exercitium theologicum aliquis habitus ad- 55
quiritur, aliter esset studium otiosum. Et non fides, quia aeque
bene habetur sine tali studio sicut cum tali, ut patet de vetulis
et simplicibus Christianis. Nee opinio, cum includat for-
midem, et est contra statum fidelis, nam ut dicitur Extra-
vaganteSy 'De haereticis':8 "Dubius in fide infidelis est." Nee 60
ars, cum sit respectu factibilium, ut dicitur VI Ethicorum.9
Nee prudentia, quia tune maiores theologi essent prudenti-
ores, cuius oppositum experimur- Ergo adquiritur vel sapien-
tia, (vel) intellectus, vel scientia; quorum si aliquod detur,
habetur propositum, cum quilibet praemissorum habituum sit 65
habitus evidens, ut ex ipsorum definitionibus potest clarius
apparere-
(DIV1SIO PROLOGl)
Pro decisione quaestionis istius iuxta materiam
trium argumentorum ad quaestionis oppositum adductorum 70
tres erunt articuli pertractandi, quorum primus, iuxta ma-
teriam primi argumenti: Utrum habitus theologiae sit tantum
creditivus seu probabilis in studente, vel sic: Utrum habitus
per exercitium theologicum adquisitus sit evidentis notitiae
portio substantiva- Secundus, iuxta secundi argumenti ma- 75
teriam: Utrum in intellectu studentis theologiam fides et sci-
entia possint simul exsistere subiective, vel sic: Utrum in
eadem mente respectu eiusdem obiecti fides et evidens notitia
possint simul exsistere subiective. Tertius, iuxta materiam
tertii argumenti: Utrum studenti theologiae, ut viator est, 80
repugnet cognitio scientifica credibilium veritatum, vel sic:
Utrum veritatum credibilium evidens notitia viatorum statui
formaliter sit repugnans.
8. In Έxtravagantibus primis,' that is, in Compilatione I (= Breviarium extravagan-
tium Bernardi Papiensis, c. 1187-1191), ed. A. Augustini, Antiquae decretalium collec-
tiones (Paris, 1621), 123; following Decretales Greg. IX, lib. V, tit. 7 "De hereticis,"
cap. 1 (ed. A. Friedberg, Corpus luris Canonici, 2:778).
9. Aristotle Nic. Ethics 6.4.1140al-23.
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(ARTICUWS PRIMUS)
85 Pro declaratione primi articuli sic procedam:
primo quorundam doctorum opiniones praemittam; se-
cundo eliciam seu conflabo positionem meam per certas con-
clusiones; ex quibus patebit quid sentio de materia quaesti-
onis.
90 <ί. OPINIONES AL1QUORUM DOCTORUM:
OPIN1O PETR1 AUREOL1)
Quantum ad primum est advertendum quod
dominus frater Petrus Aureoli, Scripto suo pήmo super Senten-
tίasy prima questione prologi, articulo secundo,10 sententiali-
95 ter sic imaginatur, dicens quod in sacra scriptura est multiplex
processus: quandoque ad propositionem scitam, quandoque ad
creditam, quandoque ad credendam. Et secundum hoc potest
imaginari septuplex processus, videlicet triplex simplex et
quadruplex compositus. Simplex (est) vel ex propositionibus
100 necessariis tantum vel ex probabilibus tantum, vel ex simplici-
ter creditis tantum. Compositus seu mixtus est vel ex omnibus
simul, vel ex una necessaria et altera probabili, vel ex una
necessaria et altera credita, vel ex una credita et altera proba-
bili. Ex quibus dicit quattuor theologica documenta:
105 primum, quod in primo processu adquiritur habitus scien-
tificus. Secundum, quod in secundo processu adquiritur ha-
bitus dumtaxat probabilis- Tertium, quod in tertio processu
adquiritur habitus tantummodo creditivus. Quartum quod in
quarto processu, quo videlicet proceditur ex omnibus simul, et
110 cum hoc adducuntur rationes et dubia persolvuntur, adquiritur
proprie habitus theologicus. Quod qualis sit quattuor ponit
conclusiones. Prima, quod habitus huiusmodi est alius a fide.
Secunda, quod non est habitus adhaesivus. Tertia, quod est
habitus dumtaxat declarativus. Quarta, quod est huiusmodi
115 habitus habet vere rationem sapientiae virtutis intellectualis.
(CONTRA OP1NIONEM PETR1 AUREOLI)
Licet ilia positio videatur probabilis quoad
multa, tamen quoad d u o ipsius d i c t a quae mihi in hac parte
10. Aureoli Scriptum l.pro.l (ed. E. M. Buytaert, 1:132-175).
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non videntur vera arguam contra ipsam. Primum, in hoc
quod dicit quod ex omnibus propositionibus, videlicet proba- 120
bilibus, necessariis et creditis, generatur habitus theologicus.
Contra hoc arguo sic: quilibet habitus discursive causatus ex
habitibus vel propositionibus differentibus secundum perfec-
tionem semper sequitur naturam minus perfecti. Sed habitus
discursive causatus ex propositionibus necessariis, probabilibus 125
et simpliciter creditis simul est habitus discursive causatus ex
habitibus vel propositionibus differentibus secundum perfec-
tionem; ergo huiusmodi habitus sequitur naturam habitus
minus perfecti. Cum igitur inter omnes habitus probabilis sive
creditivus sit minus perfectus, sequitur quod habitus huius- 130
modi erit aut creditivus aut probabilis et per consequens non
theologicus iuxta suam imaginationem. Maior huius rationis
patet ex hoc quia in omni discursiva mixtione semper conclu-
sio sequitur naturam minus perfectae aut debilioris praemissae,
ut vult Philosophus,11 et omnes logicae tractatores. Et minor 135
est de se nota; ergo etc.
Confirmatur exemplariter, nam formata copulativa cuius
una pars sit necessaria et altera contingens in forma syl-
logistica, conclusio sequens de necessitate erit contingens.
Verbi gratia: omne ens est substantia; Sortes est ens; ergo 140
Sortes est substantia. Constat manifeste quod conclusio quae
contingens dinoscitur, videlicet 'Sortes est substantia', non
naturam imitatur propositionis necessariae sed potius contin-
gentis, et ita regulariter in omni syllogistica mixtione reperies;
ergo ad praedicta conformiter habitus discursive causatus ex 145
omnibus praemissis simpliciter sequitur naturam habitus
minus perfecti, quod erat probandum.
Secundum dictum suum quod mihi non placet (est hoc)
quod est eius quarta conclusio, videlicet habitus theologicus
habet vere rationem sapientiae virtutis intellectualis. Contra 150
hoc arguo sic: vel accipit sapientiam proprie vel metaphorice.
Si metaphorice, nihil ad propositum, (quia) sic posset vocare
habitum theologicum asinum, propter quandam similitudinem
quam habet cum asino, quia quilibet eorum est ens. Si autem
accipit proprie; contra: omnis habitus sapientialis est ad- 155
i i . Aristotle Prior Analytics 1.27.43b37.
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haesivus, cum sit evίdens; sed per ipsum ex sua conclusione
secunda habitus theologicus non est adhaesivus, ergo per con-
sequens nee sapientialis. Praeterea, si habitus theologicus es-
set sapientia proprie, tune esset evidentior habitu scientifico,
160 quia scientia capit evidentiam ab intellectu; nunc autem sa-
pientia est intellectus et scientia simul, ut vult Philosophus,
VI Ethicorum.12 Consequens est falsum, etiam secundum eum,
nam in pugnando dicta Sancti Thomae qui tenet quod habitus
theologicus habet rationem scientiae subalternae dicit quod
165 hoc non potest esse per hoc quod omnis scientia causat evi-
dentiam, cuiusmodi non facit habitus theologicus.13 Ergo, si
loquatur proprie, sibi ipsi contradicit; si vero improprie, nihil
ad proposίtum. Et (haec) tantum de ista positione, quia impro-
bando dicta mea etiam improbabuntur haec dicta.
170 (OPIN1O GREGORI1 DE AR1M1NO)
Ulterius est Gregorius de Arimino qui dicit
quattuor circa propositam quaestionem, prima quaestione
prologi, articulo quarto.14 Primum, quod ex discursu theo-
logico non adquiritur scientia. Secundum, quod adquiritur
175 adhaesio. Tertium, quod adquiritur adhaesio sine formidine.
Quartum, quod adquiritur (habitus creditivus) sive fides. Ex
quo patebit15 quod huiusmodi habitus theologicus qui commu-




Haec positio quoad ultimam suam conclusion
nem, si intelligatur cum exclusione, ut ipse videtur dicere ar-
guendo etiam contra positionem domini Petri Aureoli, non
185 videtur vera. Cuius improbatio apparebit ex probatione con-
clusionum mearum.
12. Aristotle Nic. Ethics 6.7.114lb2-3.
13. Aureoli Scriptum l.pro.1.30 (ed. Buytaert, 1:140).
14. Gregory of Rimini Sent. 1.pro. 1.2 (ed. Venice, 1521, a2vK-A3vK).
15. patebit] dicit add. cod.
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(OPINIO BEATί THOMAE AQUINATIS)
Alii dixerunt quod habebat rationem scientiae
subalternae, ut beatus Thomas.16
(OPINIO 1OANN1 DE NEAPOLί ATTRIBUTA) 190
Alii17 (vero dixerunt) quod est tantum notitia
consequentiarum.
(OP1N1ONES IN GENERAL1)
Unde generaliter quidam 1 8 tenent quod habi-
tus theologiae est scientia; et quidam 1 9 quod non- Tenentes 195
negativam (aliqui) 2 0 dicunt quod non est creditivus; ali i 2 1
quod sic. Vult igitur beatus Thomas quod theologia sit scien-
tia proprie dicta. Vult dominus Petrus Aureoli quod non sit
scientia, nee habitus creditivus sed tantum declarativus. Vult
Gregorius quod sit tantum creditivus. 200
(11 RESPONSIO AUCTORIS)
Omissis igitur positionibus istorum doctorum
quae mihi in certis suis dictis non placent, venio ad illud quod
mihi videtur magis consonum veritati et prout potest colligi ex
dictis Doctoris Subtilis, III Sententiarum, distinctione 24,22 205
16. Thomas Aquinas Summa theologiae 1.1.2.
17. John of Naples Quaestiones variae Parisiis disputatae 18.3.5 (ed. Naples, 1618,
154): "Si vero loquamur de hac doctrina quantum ad suas conclusiones, sic etiam
dicendum est quod est scientia proprie et stricte. Scimus enim quod conclusiones
huius doctrinae necessario sequuntur ex suis principiis. Sic ergo patet quod haec
doctrina potest dici scientia quinque modis. . . . Quinto potest dici scientia conse-
quentiarum; scit enim theologus quod conclusiones theologiae necessario sequuntur
ex suis principiis."
18. Thomas Aquinas Summa theologiae 1.1.2.
19. Averroes In Aristot. Metaph. 2.1 (ed. Juntas 8:14rb-va); in Arίstot. De anima
3.36 (ed. F. S. Crawford, 494-495). This opinion is attributed to Averroes by Henry
of Ghent Summa 4.5 (ed. Paris, 1520, 1:32B-33E).
20. Aureoli Scήptum l.pro. 1.96-111 (ed. Buytaert, 1:160-164).
21. Gregory of Rimini Sent, l.pro. 1.2 (ed. Venice, 1521, a2vK-a3vK).
22. John Duns Scotus Sent. 3.24.1 (ed. Vives, 15:36-49).
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et Venerabilis Inceptoris Ockham, quaestione septima
prologi,23 inter omnes mediando, pro cuius24 declarationes
septem pono conclusiones.
Prima conclusio: intellectus viatoris per exercitium
210 theologicum adquirit habitum ultra fidem. Haec conclusio sic
probatur: positis causis sufficientibus et non impeditis ad pro-
ductionem alicuius effectus (necessario) ponitur ille effectus;
sed propositiones in sacra scriptura contentae cum proposi-
tionibus aliis naturaliter adquisitis et lumen naturale intellectus
215 agentis quo intellectus exercitatur in declarando et exponendo
sacram scripturam sunt causae sufficientes ad productionem
certi habitus; ergo his positis in intellectu studentis theologiae
necessario causabunt aliquem habitum, et non fidem, quia, ut
suppono, illam prius habebat; ergo aliquem alium, quod est
220 propositum- S i d i c a tu r quod licet non adquirat fidem, tamen
augmenta est; contra: omnis habitus adhaesivus per aliquod
tempus augmentatus in fine illius temporis firmius adhaeret
per ilium habitum habens eum quam prius; patet de se- Sed in
fine exercitii theologici non firmius quis adhaeret quam ante,
225 ut experientia docet; ergo propositum.
Praeterea, quicumque habet aliquem actum intellectus in
sua potestate ab actu assentiendi distinctum respectu credi-
tae veritatis habet alium habitum a fide. Sed exercitatus in
theologia habet actum huiusmodi, ergo conclusio vera. Con-
230 sequentia patet, et maior est Philosophi, II De animay25
dicentis quod habitibus operamur cum volumus. Et minor de-
claratur, quoniam iste sic exercitatus novit reddere rationem
et fidem defensare et infirmos roborare. Sed constat quod isti
actus sunt valde distincti ab actu assentiendi, aliter hos actus
235 haberent similiter simplices fideles, quod non videtur verum;
ergo conclusio vera.
Praeterea, frustra fit per plura quod potest fieri per pau-
ciora.26 Sed si per exercitium theologicum nullum alium
habitum a fide adquirit studens in theologia, sequitur quod
23. William Ockham Scriptum in I Sent. pro.7 (ed. Gal and Brown, 195-196).
24. cuius corr. cod. ex quaestione interl (al. man.).
25. Aristotle On the Soul 2.5.417b23-24.
26. Aristotle Physics 1.4.188al7-18.
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huiusmodi exercitium est frustra, cum sine tali potest adqui- 240
rere talem habitum, ut simplices fideles faciunt; ergo praeter
habitum fidei oportet ponere alium habitum in studente.
Ex hac conclusione apparet falsitas opinionis Gregorii, si
intelligat conclusionem suam universaliter, ut apparet. Unde
advertendum est quod opinantem decipit hoc, quia omnis 245
propositio vel est necessaria et evidens vel probabilis vel cre-
dita, ideo imaginatur quod ex his simul non potest sequi nisi
credita vel probabilis, et quod propositionum quae in theo-
logico exercitio sumuntur communiter altera illarum est ere-
dita. Ideo dicit quod ex his simul non potest adquiri aliud 250
quam habitus creditivus.
Propterea dico quod ex propositionibus aliquem habitum
causari contingit dupliciter: vel illative vel collative.
Verbi gratia, nunc adhaereo certae conclusioni in sacra pagina
contentae, et postea per aliquam propositionem sacrae scrip- 255
turae infero illam. Tune de ilia propositione causatur in me, si
actus fuerit frequentatus, habitus quo adhaereo, et iste est
causatus illative. Secundo modo possum adhaerere omnibus
propositionibus contentis in sacra scriptura, non uni propter
aliam sed omnibus aeque immediate; tune conferendo unam 260
cum alia, ex isto frequenti actu causatur in me unus habitus,
qui non est fides, quo reddo rationem de his quae continentur
in sacra pagina, et istum modum forsan non viderunt op-
positum affirmantes.
Secunda conclusio: habitus huiusmodi taliter adquisitus 265
sub evidenti notitia minime continetur. Haec conclusio sic
probatur: nullus habitus qui potest stare cum errore est evidens
notitia; sed habitus huiusmodi taliter adquisitus potest stare
cum errore; ergo conclusio vera. Consequentia patet; et maior
probatur ex hoc, quoniam omnis notitia evidens vel est neces- 270
saria vel contingens; sed nulla notitia evidens necessaria po-
test stare cum errore, cum ilia sit vel sapientia, (vel) intel-
lectus, vel scientia, qui sunt habitus de necessitate veridici.
Nee etiam contingens, quia licet talis posset non esse, non
tamen staret quod esset evidens et erronea, igitur simpliciter 275
maior vera. Minor vero declaratur, nam signo certum mag-
num theologum qui postmodum effϊciatur hereticus; certum
est quod licet iste perdat habitum creditivum, non tamen
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ilium per quern sciebat sacram scripturam exponere. Ergo ille
280 habitus ita stat cum errore sicut sine errore; et per consequens
conclusio vera.
Praeterea, omnem habitum quern potest naturaliter ad'
quirere fidelis potest et infidelis; sed huiusmodi habitum potest
naturaliter adquirere fidelis; ergo et infidelis. Maior patet,
285 quoniam individua eiusdem speciei aeque naturaliter possunt.
Minor vero apparet, quia omnis talis habitus potest adquiri a
parvulo (infideli) inter fideles nutrito. Et tune ultra ab infideli
potest adquiri talis habitus respectu credibilium (veritatum),
et non evidens notitia, quia sic firmissime adhaereret, et ita
290 non esset infidelis, quod est contra suppositum.
Praeterea, omnis habitus evidens inducit certitudinem ultra
fidem; sed talis habitus (theologicus) non inducit certitudinem
ultra fidem; ergo conclusio vera. Consequentia et maior pa-
tent; et minor declaratur, quoniam habens talem habitum non
295 firmius adhaeret per talem habitum et fidem quam per solam
fidem; ergo propositum. Consequentia patet; et antecedens est
notum de studentibus in theologia qui non experiuntur se
firmius adhaerere huic 'Deus est trinus et unus' post exercitium
theologicum quam ante; ergo propositum.
300 Tert ia conclusio: habitus huiusmodi taliter adquisitus
non exsistit habitus adhaesivus. Haec conclusio sic probatur:
omnis habitus adhaesivus est sapientia, intellectus, scientia,
fides vel opinio. Sed habitus huiusmodi non est sapientia,
intellectus vel scientia, nee fides nee opinio; ergo conclusio
305 vera. Consequentia patet; et maior declaratur, quoniam omnis
adhaerens alicui aut adhaeret propter evidentiam necessariam
aut contingentem. Si primo modo, aut ilia est evidentia prin-
cipiorum, et sic est intellectus, aut conclusionum, et sic est
scientia, aut tarn principiorum quam conclusionum, et sic est
310 sapientia, ut vult Philosophus, VI Ethicorum.27 Si secundo
modo aut adhaeret ex notitia intuitiva singularium, et sic
habetur communis notitia contingentium, ut videndo Sortem
et albedinem adhaereo (huic): quod Sortes est albus. Aut ex
auctoritate dicentis, et sic est fides. Aut adhaereo ex aliquali
315 rerum apparentia, et sic opinio causatur. Sed minor de-
27. Aristotle Nic. Ethics 6.7.1141b2-3.
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claratur, nam iste habitus ex quo per secundam conclusionem
non est evidens sequitur quod nee sapientia, intellectus, vel
scientia. Nee est fides, ut dicit prima conclusio. Nee est opi-
nio, quia huiusmodi habitus includit formidem et per conse-
quens repugnat fidei. Sed iste habitus stat cum fide; ergo 320
minor vera et per consequens conclusio.
Praeterea, omnis habitus adhaesivus causatur illative vel ex
propositionibus necessariis vel probabilibus vel simpliciter ere-
ditis vel ex experientia rerum. Sed huiusmodi habitus non
causatur ex aliquo istorum (modorum) illative, nee ex expert 325
entia rerum; ergo conclusio vera. Consequentia et maior pa-
tent. Et minor declaratur, quoniam, ut dictum est in decla-
ratione primae conclusionis, huiusmodi habitus causatur
collative potius quam illative. Nee etiam habetur ex experi-
entia, proprie loquendo de experientia qua quis certificatur ut 330
apparet; ergo propositum.
Praeterea, si habitus huiusmodi esset adhaesivus, aut con-
vertibiliter, aut disparate, aut secundum superius et inferius,
aut per accidens. Sed nullum illorum modorum est verum;
ergo conclusio vera. Consequentia et maior patent. 335
Et minor probatur: non primo modo, quia tune omnis habi-
tus adhaesivus esset huiusmodi habitus; quod est falsum. Nee
secundo modo, quia sic nullo modo possunt convenire. Nee
tertio modo, quia quandocumque aliqua se habent secundum
superius et inferius, quidquid potest praedicari de superiori 340
universaliter potest et de inferiori; sed de habitu adhaesivo
universaliter sumpto praedicatur sufficienter hoc disiunctum:
sapientia, vel intellectus, vel scientia, vel fides vel opinio; ergo
et posset praedicari de habitu huiusmodi; quod est falsum, ut in
prima ratione ostensum est. Nee quarto modo, quia tune ac- 345
cidens esset subiectum accidentis, quod non communiter est
concessum, nam si iste habitus est adhaesivus per accidens huic
habitui inhaereret adhaesio qua formaliter est adhaesivus, et sic
accidens est subiectum accidentis; patet igitur conclusio.
Quarta conclusio: habitus huiusmodi taliter adquisitus 350
est theologicus proprie, qui potest declarativus merito nun-
cupari. Haec conclusio sic probatur, et primo quoad primam
partem, videlicet quod sit theologicus: quilibet habitus
causatus ex exercitio alicuius facultatis dicitur pertinere ad
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355 illam facultatem, sicut habitus causatus ex exercitio geometrae
dicitur esse geometricus et ex exercitio logicae logicus, et sic
de similibus- Sed iste habitus, ut prius apparuit, causatur ex
collatione propositionum contentarum in sacra scriptura; ergo
est vere theologicus. Quoad secundam partem similiter pro-
360 batur conclusio, videlicet quod sit declarativus: omnis habitus
inducens explicationes terminorum, solutiones dubiorum, ex-
empla et manuductiones est vere declarativus; sed habitus
huiusmodi est talis; ergo conclusio vera. Consequentia et
maior patent, Et minor declaratur, quoniam exercitatus in
365 theologia hoc habet ultra simplicem fidelem: quod novit ra-
tionem reddere de his quae continentur in sacra scriptura, et
similiter defensare; quare propositum-
Haec conclusio expresse est de mente beati Augustini,
XIV De Tήnitate, cap- primo,28 ubi hunc habitum vocat scien-
370 tiam, large tamen sumendo scientiae nomen, ubi sic dicit:
Ή a c scientia non pollent fideles plurimi, quamvis polleant
ipsa fide plurimum. Aliud est enim scire tantummodo quid
homo credere debeat propter adipiscendam vitam beatam
quae nonnisi aeterha est; aliud autem, scire quemadmodum
375 hoc ipsum et piis opituletur et contra impios defendatur."
Haec ille. Ex quibus apparet veritas conclusionis-
Quinta conclusio: praeter habitum superius nominatum
per theologicum exercitium adquiritur creditivus habitus qui
theologicus potest similiter nominari- Haec conclusio sic pro-
380 batur: omnis habitus causatus ex propositionibus in sacra
scriptura contentis est theologicus; sed habitus creditivus est
huiusmodi; ergo conclusio vera- Minor vero probatur, quo-
niam ex propositionibus in sacra scriptura contentis discursive
infero unam propositionem cui per prius non adhaerebam et
385 nunc adhaereo; sed constat quod huiusmodi adhaesio non ex-
cedit fidem, cum adhaesio conclusionis non excedat adhaesi-
onem illius unde causatur; ergo simpliciter ex tali discursu
adquiritur habitus creditivus-
Ista conclusio expresse videtur de mente Salvatoris, loan
390 20: 2 9 Haec scripta sunt ut credatis, et ut credentes vitam habeatis.
28. Augustine De Tήnitate 14.1 (PL 42:1037; CCL 50A:421-422).
29. John 20.31.
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Sexta conclusio: habitus theologicus per creditivum et
declarativum habitus dividitur adaequate. Volo dicere quod
omnis habitus theologicus (vel) est creditivus vel declarativus.
Haec conclusio sic probatur: omnis habitus causatus ex propo-
sitionibus in sacra scriptura content is vel causatur discursive 395
vel illative—seu collative; sed omnis habitus theologicus est
habitus causatus ex propositionibus in sacra scriptura con-
tentis; ergo omnis habitus theologicus vel causatur discursive
vel collative. Ergo est creditivus vel declarativus. Probo istam
consequentiam, quia omnes propositiones in sacra scriptura 400
contentae vel sunt necessariae et evidentes vel creditae. Sed
constat quod ex his discursive nihil aliud adquiritur quam
habitus creditivus; ergo propositum. Si vero sit inter eas col-
latio, non adhaerendo uni propter aliam sed ipsas dumtaxat ad
invicem conferendo, tune certum est quod adquiritur habitus 405
tantum declarativus; ex quibus patet conclusionis veritas.
Septima et ultima conclusio est haec: praeter habitus
superius nominatos per exercitium theologicum adquisitos
possunt de veritatibus theologiae adquiri plures habitus non
theologici ad diversas scientias pertinentes. Haec conclusio sic 410
probatur: in sacra scriptura continentur non solum veritates
speculativae sed etiam practicae, non solum necessariae sed
etiam probabiles et contingentes. Sed constat quod de primis,
videlicet speculabilibus et necessariis, utpote "Deus est actus
purus," "Deus est summum bonum" habetur notitia evidens et 415
scientifica causata ex propositionibus necessariis evidenter
notis lumine naturali, ut patet per argumenta philosophan-
tium quae fiunt ab effectu ad causam demonstratione quia;
ergo de ipsis causatur habitus scientificus. Et sicut ex verita-
tibus speculativis scientificus habitus (habetur), ita ex morale 420
bus practicus. Et sic de aliis habitus varii causantur, et per
consequens conclusio quoad primam partem (est) vera.
Quod autem huiusmodi habitus non sint theologici patet ex
praedictis, quoniam habitus (proprie) theologicus viatoris se^
cundum communem cursum naturae non est evidens. Et dico 425
signanter 'habitus viatoris secundum cursum naturae' ad dif-
ferentiam habituum comprehensorum qui sunt evidentes—
similiter, ad differentiam habituum qui possunt alicui infideli
praeter cursum naturae ex omnipotentis imperio voluntatis:
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430 quales fuerunt infusi beato Paulo in raptu, qui secundum com-
munem doctorum opinionem fuerunt evidentes; de quarum
notitiarum differentia loquitur Apostolus, I Ad Cσήnthios
13:3 0 Videmus nunc per speculum et in aenigmate—quoad viato-
res; tune autem facie ad faciem—quoad comprehensores. Est
435 ergo conclusionis intentio (loqui) de habitu adquisito per exer-
citium theologicum a viatore secundum cursum naturae; qui
habitus est proprie theologicus cum sit causatus ex propositi-
onibus revelatis et necessariis ad aeternam beatitudinem con-
sequendam, et iste non alius in genere quam creditivus vel
440 declarativus dinoscitur, ut superius est expressum. Constat
autem quod praemissi habitus sunt evidentes, ergo non theo-
logici, et per consequens tota conclusio vera.
Ex qua positione apparet facillime, et sequitur correlarie,
quod habitus theologiae non est scientia proprie dicta: contra
445 positionem beati Thomae. Similiter, quod praeter habitum
creditivum adquiritur habitus alius a fide: contra opinionem
GregoriL Similiter, quod adquiritur habitus adhaesivus: con-
tra opinionem domini Petri Aureoli- Sequitur quarto quod
non est opinio—contra aestimationem philosophorum
450 communiter opinatam.
(DUB1TAT1ONES ET SOWT1ONES EARUM)
Quamvis autem istae conclusiones videantur ve-
rae, tamen est dubium de duabus conclusionibus ultimis, vi-
delicet sexta et septima. Primum dubium est circa sextam
455 conclusionem, quod non videtur verum quod habitus theo-
logicus sit sufficienter divisus in creditivum et declarativum,
cum omnis ille habitus sit theologicus qui causatur ex proposi-
tionibus theologicis* Nunc vero multae sunt veritates theo-
logicae naturaliter cognoscibiles, ut Όeus est sapiens/ et sic
460 de multis aliis; ergo habitus adquisitus non est creditivus
sed evidens in lumine naturali. Quod autem tales veritates
sint theologicae apparet, quia sunt necessariae ad aeternam
beatitudinem consequendam, et tales vocat theologicas beatus
Augustinus, XIV De Tήnitatey cap. L
3 1
30. 1 Corinthians 13.12.
31. Augustine De Tήnitate 14.1 (PL 42:1037; CCL 50A:421-422).
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Secundum dubium est quia si multi habitus de verita- 465
tibus theologiae adquirerentur ad diversas scientias perti-
nentes, ut innuit conclusio septima, tune idem habitus esset
theologicus et metaphysicus, quod non videtur verum.
Ad primum istorum dico quod licet multae veritates theo-
logicae sint naturaliter cognoscibiles, non tamen ut theo- 470
logicae theologia viatoris. Unde habens utrumque habitum,
tarn videlicet creditivum quam declarativum, etiam si nullam
talem veritatem cognosceret in lumine naturali, non minus
adhaereret eidem. Dico igitur quod licet eandem veritatem
possimus cognoscere diversis viis, non tamen sequitur quod 475
habitus theologicus sit evidens, sed sequitur quod respectu
eiusdem veritatis possunt esse diversi habitus per diversos dis-
cursus generati.
Unde pro maiori praedictorum declaratione advertendum
est quod multae sunt veritates theologicae quarum notitia non 480
habetur per exercitium theologicum. Verbi gratia, hae sunt
veritates theologicae: Όeus est supremum ens/ Όeus est id
quo melius excogitari non potest-' Et tamen per exercitium
quod quis habet in sacra scriptura non adquirit illarum veri-
tatum notitiam, quoniam absque tali exercitio habetur talium 485
veritatum notitia, ut patet in viris scientificis qui aliunde
talium veritatum notitiam sunt adepti. Si autem quis per
exercitium sacrae scripturae primo caperet praedictarum
veritatum notitiam, tune talis notitia esset theologica et non
evidens, tamen ipsius notitia ex propositionibus dumtaxat ere- 490
ditis causaretur. Unde si postea se in aliis scientiis exercitaret,
utpote philosophiae naturalis aut metaphysicae, tune adqui-
reret illarum veritatum notitiam evidentem, et priorem amit-
teret, theologicam videlicet creditivam. Sicut tenens per fϊ-
dem quod triangulus habet tres angulos aequales duobus rectis, 495
si postea se exercitet in geometria adquiret habitum evi-
dentem de ilia conclusione, per cuius adquisitionem desinet
prima notitia tantummodo creditiva. Et si non subito quoad
substantiam habitus tamen quoad potentiam perceptivam to-
taliter immutat, prout in sequenti dicetur articulo.32 Simili- 500
ter, viator nunc tenet per fidem quod Deus est trinus et unus.
32. Peter of Candia Sent Lpro.2 (cod. Vat. lat 1081, ff. 12rb-15ra).
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Cum autem pervenerit ad patriam habebit praemissae veritatis
notitiam evidentem, et tune evacuatur notitia creditiva iuxta
illud Apostoli, ί Ad Cor. 14:33 Cum autem υenerit quod per-
505 fectum est evacuabitur quod ex pane est. Non ergo habeo pro
aliquo inconvenienti quod aliquae veritates theologicae sint
viatoribus evidenter notae. Sed bene haberem pro inconve-
nienti quod veritates huiusmodi, naturaliter videlicet cog-
noscibiles, essent viatoribus evidenter notae theologia viatoris
510 secundum cursum naturae. Unde non sequitur: haec veritas
est theologica, ergo eius notitia est theologica, theologia vide-
licet viatoris secundum cursum naturae. Propter quod conce-
dendae sunt istae propositiones: 'aliqua notitia de veritatibus
theologiae non est theologica/ 'aliqua est veritas theologica
515 cuius notitia non adquiritur per exercitium theologicum
viatoris/ 'alicuius veritatis naturaliter cognoscibilis adhaesio
est viatori necessaria ad aeternam beatitudinem consequent
dam/
Et per praedicta patet responsio ad secundum dubium:
520 quod nullum est inconveniens eandem veritatem ad diversas
facultates vel scientias, sumendo nomen scientiae largo modo,
pertinere. Verbi gratia, simplex fidelis habet istam Όeus est
unus' ex fide, ut dicitur in symbolo 'Credo in unum Deum,' et
sic dicitur theologica. Metaphysicus vero demonstrat eandem,
525 ut patet, XII Metaphysicae:3* "Entia neque volunt male dis-
poni, unus ergo princeps." Et sic respectu eiusdem veritatis
sunt metaphysicus habitus et theologicus, et ita eadem veritas
ad diversas reducitur facultates. Et si dicatur: quomodo re-
spectu eiusdem habetur habitus evidens et inevidens, meta-
530 physicus videlicet et theologicus; dicitur quod hoc pervenit ex
varietate subiectorum, nam unitas obiectiva varietati non ob-
viat subiectivae. Sed utrum stante unitate tarn ex parte obiecti
quam subiecti sit possibilitas, de hoc nihil ad praesens, quia in
sequenti articulo ista materia declarabitur. Ex quibus luculen-
535 ter apparet quid de isto primo articulo sit tenendum.
33. 1 Corinthians 13.10.
34. Aristotle Metaphysics 12.10.1076a3-4.
